Fifth Plenary Assembly: Background Paper

THE CHURCH IN ASIA AND POLITICS
Two Case Histories in Asia

I. The Church and Politics, by Bienvenido F. Nebres
II. The Involvement of the Laity in Politics: The Church in Indonesia,
    by Robert H. Hardawiryana

I. THE CHURCH AND POLITICS*
   by
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This is an immensely complex topic and, to keep it under some restraints, I shall present a short summary of the Church's teaching; then how this teaching can guide our decisions in the area of Church and politics; then what the Church went through in the Philippines as an illustration.

I. THE CHURCH AND THE DIFFERENT DIMENSIONS AND STRUCTURES
   OF SOCIETY

1. The Religious Dimension

The basic document is Dignitatis Humanae and the position of the Church is to state the right to religious liberty (DH 4), and at the same time to accept legitimate restraints on this liberty (DH 7).

DH 4. The freedom or immunity from coercion in matters religious which is the endowment of persons as individuals is also to be recog-

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nized as their right when they act in community. Religious bodies are a requirement of the social nature both of man and of religion itself.

Provided the just requirements of public order are observed, religious bodies rightfully claim freedom in order that they may govern themselves according to their own norms, honor the Supreme Being in public worship, assist their members in the practice of the religious life, strengthen them by instruction, and promote institutions in which they may join together for the purpose of ordering their own lives in accordance with their religious principles.

DH 7. The right to religious freedom is exercised in human society; hence its exercise is subject to certain regulatory norms. 20. In the use of all freedoms, the moral principle of personal and social responsibility is to be observed.

2. The Cultural and Social Dimension

a) The Church asserts the autonomy of the cultural dimension (from being reduced to the political). The same assertions could be made about the social dimension. This is of importance since the Church asserts the right to engage in cultural and social institutions — in the transformation of society.

(Gaudium et Spes) GS 59. Because it flows immediately from man’s spiritual and social nature, culture has constant need of a just freedom if it is to develop. It also needs the legitimate possibility of exercising its independence according to its own principles. Rightly, therefore, it demands respect and enjoys a certain inviolability, at least as long as the rights of the individual and of the community, whether particular or universal, are preserved within the context of the common good.

b) Christian institutions participate in the building of society.

DH 4. In addition, it comes within the meaning of religious freedom that religious bodies should not be prohibited from freely undertaking to show the special value of their doctrine in what concerns the organization of society and the inspiration of the whole of human activity.11 Finally, the social nature of man and the very nature of religion afford the foundation of the right of men freely to hold meetings and to establish educational, cultural, charitable, and social organizations, under the impulse of their own religious sense.
c) The Church needs liberty to act to fulfill her mission in society.

DH 13. In human society and in the face of government, the Church claims freedom for herself in her character as a spiritual authority, established by Christ the Lord. Upon this authority there rests, by divine mandate, the duty of going out into the whole world and preaching the gospel to every creature. The Church also claims freedom for herself in her character as a society of men who have the right to live in society in accordance with the precepts of Christian faith.

In turn, where the principle of religious freedom is not only proclaimed in words or simply incorporated in law but also given sincere and practical application, there the Church succeeds in achieving a stable situation of right as well as of fact and the independence which is necessary for the fulfillment of her divine mission. This independence is precisely what the authorities of the Church claim in society.

3. Church and Political Structures

The fundamental position established by the Church towards the State (political power) is a balance between autonomy and co-operation and helping society towards the “usage of freedom in their full range.”

GS 76. In their proper spheres, the political community and the Church are mutually independent and self-governing. Yet, by a different title, each serves the personal and social vocation of the same human beings. This service can be more effectively rendered for the good of all, if each works better for wholesome mutual co-operation, depending on the circumstances of time and place.

The Church herself employs the things of time to the degree that her own proper mission demands. Still she does not lodge her hope in privileges conferred by civil authority. Indeed, she stands
ready to renounce the exercise of certain legitimately acquired rights if it becomes clear that their use raises doubt about the sincerity of her witness or that new conditions of life demand some other arrangement.

DH 7. ... society has the right to defend itself against possible abuses committed on pretext of freedom of religion. However, government is not to act in arbitrary fashion or in an unfair spirit of partisanship. Its action is to be controlled by juridical norms which are in conformity with the objective moral order.

These norms arise out of the need for effective safeguard of the rights of all citizens and for peaceful settlement of conflicts of rights. They flow from the need for an adequate care of genuine public peace, which comes about when men live together in good order and in true justice. They come, finally, out of the need for a proper guardianship of public morality. These matters constitute the basic component of the common welfare: they are what is meant by public order.

For the rest, they, the usages of society are to be the usages of freedom in their full range. These require that the freedom of man be respected as far as possible, and curtailed only when and in so far as necessary.

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DH, footnote 20. It is a matter of common sense that the exercise of all freedoms in society must be subject to certain regulatory norms. The Declaration states first the moral norm — the principle of personal and social responsibility. Its restraints, of course, are self-imposed. More difficult is the question of the juridical norm which should control the action of government in limiting or inhibiting the exercise of the right to religious freedom. The Declaration adopts the concept of public order. The concept has good warrant in constitutional law. However, it is more frequently used than defined. The Declaration undertakes to define it. In doing so, it makes a contribution to the science of law and jurisprudence.

First, the requirements of public order are not subject to arbitrary definition — at the hands, say, of tyrannical governments, which might abuse the concept for their own ends. The public order or society is a part of the universal moral order; its requirements must be rooted in moral law. Second, public order exhibits a threefold content. First, the order of society is essentially an order of justice, in which the rights of all citizens are effectively safe-guarded, and provision is made for peaceful settlement of conflicts of rights. Second, the order of society is a political order, an order of peace (“domestic tranquillity,” is the American constitutional phrase). It is, in the classic concept, the work of justice; it comes about, of itself, when the demands of justice are met, and when orderly processes exist for airing and settling grievances. Third, the order of society is a moral order, at least in the sense that certain minimal standards of public morality are enforced at all.

Public order therefore is constituted by these three values — juridical, political, moral. They are the basic elements in the common welfare, which is a wider concept than
public order. And so necessary are these three values that the coercive force of government may be enlisted to protect and vindicate them. Together they furnish a reasonable juridical criterion for coercive restriction of freedom. The free exercise of religion may not be inhibited unless proof is given that it entails some violation of the rights of others, or of the public peace, or of public morality. In these cases, in other words, a public action ceases to be a religious exercise and becomes a penal offense.

DH, footnote 21. Secular experts may well consider this to be the most significant sentence in the Declaration. It is a statement of the basic principle of the "free society." The principle has important origins in the medieval tradition of kingship, law and jurisprudence. But its statement by the Church has an accent of blessed newness — the newness of a renewal of the tradition. The renewal, already hesitantly begun by Pius XII, was strongly furthered by John XXIII. Catholic thought had consistently held that society is to be based upon truth (the truth of the human person), directed toward justice, and animated by charity. In "Pacem in Terris," John XXIII added the missing fourth term, freedom. Freedom is an end or purpose of society, which looks to the liberation of the human person. Freedom is the political method par excellence, whereby the other goals of society are reached. Freedom, finally, is the prevailing social usage, which sets the style of society. This progress in doctrine is sanctioned and made secure by "Dignitatis Humanae Personae."

II. THE CHURCH IN THE FACE OF RESTRICTIONS TO RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

The basic position of the Church was already quoted earlier. DH 6 states more precisely the obligations of state and society to assure religious freedom.

DH 6. The protection and promotion of the inviolable rights of man ranks among the essential duties of government. Therefore, government is to assume the safeguard of the religious freedom of all its citizens, in an effective manner, by just laws and by other appropriate means. Government is also to help create conditions favorable to the fostering of religious life, in order that the people may be truly enabled to exercise their religious rights and to fulfill their religious duties, and also in order that society itself may profit by the moral qualities of justice and peace which have their origin in men's faithfulness to God and to his holy will.

If, in view of peculiar circumstances obtaining among certain peoples, special legal recognition is given in the constitutional order of society to one religious body, it is at the same time imperative that the right of all citizens and religious bodies to religious freedom should be recognized and made effective in practice.37

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DH, footnote 17. This paragraph is carefully phrased. The Council did not wish to condemn the institution of "establishment," the notion of a "religion of the state." A respectable opinion maintains that the institution is compatible with full religious freedom. On the other hand, the Council did not wish to canonize the institution. A respectable opinion holds that establishment is always a threat to religious freedom.
Furthermore, the Council wished to insinuate that establishment, at least from the Catholic point of view, is a matter of historical circumstance, not of theological doctrine. For all these reasons the text deals with the issue in conditional terms.

The limits to religious freedom were quoted earlier (DH 7) in the name of public order.

III. THE CHURCH IN THE FACE OF VIOLATIONS OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS

We may refer here to Justitia in Mundo (1971) and the 1974 document of the Pontifical Commission Justitia et Pax entitled "The Church and Human Rights." We would just highlight a few points:

(a) Justice is violated in a new way today through massive violations of human rights.

JM 24. Justice is also being violated by forms of oppression, both old and new, springing from restriction of the rights of individuals. This is occurring both in the form of repression by the political power and of violence on the part of private reaction, and can reach the extreme of affecting the basic conditions of personal integrity. There are well-known cases of torture, especially of political prisoners, who besides are frequently denied due process or who are subjected to arbitrary procedures in their trial. Nor can we pass over the prisoners of war who even after the Geneva Convention are being treated in an inhuman manner.

(b) The Church is asked to respond to these violations through proclamation, denunciation, action.

JM 39. The Church has received from Christ the mission of preaching the Gospel message, which contains a call to man to turn away from sin to the love of the Father, universal brotherhood and a consequent demand for justice in the world. This is the reason why the Church has the right, indeed the duty, to proclaim justice on the social, national and international level, and to denounce instances of injustice, when the fundamental rights of man and his very salvation demand it. The Church, indeed, is not alone responsible for justice in the world; however, she has a proper and specific responsibility which is identified with her mission of giving witness before the world of the need for love and justice contained in the Gospel message, a witness to be carried out in Church institutions themselves and in the lives of Christians.

Church and Human Rights 85. However, denunciation is not the only method of putting things right; there are other ways of acting which may be better in certain circumstances, such as "symbolic
acts” or “acts of solidarity” with the poor and the oppressed when their human rights are injured.

(c) Roles of laity, priests, religious

Human rights, deriving from man’s human and intrinsically social nature, are not merely natural humanitarian rights or, as some people believe, non-political rights, but rather have a content and political implications.

There can be no question but that their observance and application belong to the social sphere and are in a special sense the work of the laity, men and women.

Nonetheless, priests and men and women religious, in their capacity as citizens of the earthly community and in fulfilment of their pastoral mission, are called upon to defend and promote human rights. For this reason the Synod of Bishops in 1971 affirmed in *The Ministerial Priestship*: “Together with the entire Church, priests are obliged, to the utmost of their ability, to select a definite pattern of action, when it is a question of the defence of fundamental human rights, the promotion of the full development of persons and the pursuit of the cause of peace and justice; the means must indeed always be consonant with the Gospel. These principles are all valid not only in the individual sphere, but also in the social field; in this regard priests should help the laity to devote themselves to forming their conscience rightly.”

IV. THE CHURCH IN THE FACE OF (IDEOLOGICAL) MOVEMENTS FOR LIBERATION.

The main document is the *Instruction on Certain Aspects of the Theology of Liberation*, issued in 1984 by the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith.

It may be easiest to situate our reflection in the context of the previous section on a situation of gross violations of human rights. The document recognizes that this is the usual context in which the Church faces the problem of ideological movements for liberation.

VII. 12. In certain parts of Latin America, the seizure of the vast majority of the wealth by an oligarchy of owners bereft of social consciousness, the practical absence or the shortcomings of a rule of law, military dictators making a mockery of elementary human rights, the corruption of certain powerful officials, the savage practices of some foreign capital interests constitute factors which
nourish a passion for revolt among those who thus consider themselves the powerless victims of a new colonialism in the technological, financial, monetary or economic order. The recognition of injustice is accompanied by a pathos which borrows its language from marxism, wrongly presented as though it were scientific language.

The Church believes that it must respond vigorously to this situation of injustice.

XI. 1. The warning against the serious deviations of some “theologies of liberation” must not at all be taken as some kind of approval, even indirect, of those who keep the poor in misery, who profit from that misery, who notice it while doing nothing about it, or who remain indifferent to it. The Church, guided by the Gospel of mercy and by the love for mankind, hears the cry for justice and intends to respond to it with all her might.

XI. 18. The defenders of orthodoxy are sometimes accused of passivity, indulgence or culpable complicity regarding the intolerable situations of injustice and the political regimes which prolong them. Spiritual conversion, the intensity of the love of God and neighbor, zeal for justice and peace, the Gospel meaning of the poor and of poverty, are required of everyone, and especially of pastors in positions of responsibility.

But the Church is concerned about the subversion of the meaning of truth, the problem of violence, the instrumentalization of the symbols of faith, which occur in certain streams of the Theology of Liberation. (This is the main burden of the document and is too long to reproduce here.)

V. HOW CAN THIS TEACHING GUIDE OUR DECISIONS IN THE AREA OF CHURCH AND POLITICS?

I shall use cases from the Philippines and divide the reflection into two parts. The first would concern cases which are shared (though in different forms and contexts) by other countries. The second concerns cases which may be more unique to the Philippines as a dominantly Catholic country, wherein the Church is an important social and cultural reality.

A. Helping create a space of freedom in the religious, cultural, social sphere.

A general analysis of the experience of the Philippines in this area would lead us to reflect on goals of our action and conditions which constrain our action.
1. **Goals.** One way of formulating goals from the Philippine experience is to take the last paragraph of *Dignitatis Humanae* 7 (cf. pp. 4-5), together with footnote 21. The goal set here is that “freedom ... be respected as far as possible and curtailed only when and in so far as necessary.” The present terminology in the Philippines for this is expanding “democratic (or democratized) space.”

2. **Conditions.** The conditions under which the Church in the Philippines has had to speak and to act were one where social and political space was bounded by an authoritarian right and a revolutionary left. In this situation, the Church defined a position of critical collaboration. In the highly polarized conditions of the Philippines, however, the problem was:

— that co-operation or collaboration could easily be seen as surrender and accommodation and possibly sacrifice of the Church’s credibility. (The Church and Human Rights 78);

— that criticism or denunciation, on the other hand, could be taken as siding with the revolutionary left and invite reprisals, as well as loss of credibility among those Christians who may feel the Church is becoming too politicized or getting too involved with the left.

**Some Cases and Experiences**

1. **Response to violations of justice and human rights**

This has been one of the dominant areas of experience of Church and the political powers. We can classify reaction patterns into roughly three:

(a) Emphasis on collaboration and accommodation with the government. This meant giving the government the benefit of the doubt. If there are violations, they are due to faults of subordinates and not due to the willful decisions of officials at the top. Complete support should be given to the government.

(b) Emphasis on the revolutionary struggle. This meant seeing these violations as basically manifestations of the fascist, imperialist, and capitalist nature of Philippine society. The goal then has to be the radical transformation of Philippine society.

(c) Emphasis on substantial reform in government: using both criticism and denunciation, as well as dialogue, towards the goal of instituting corrections of the abuses and bringing about social reform.

All tendencies were present at one time or the other in the Church’s response to the violations of human rights. Over the years, the official position of the Church moved more and more to (c). One can see the goal
of this policy as the effort of the Church to help provide the space of freedom for citizens — against unjust incursions of the state. In this process, the Church had to balance itself between the authoritarian right, which would have wanted the Church to bless (or at least close her eyes to) its violations of human rights in the name of anti-communism; and a revolutionary left, which would have wanted the Church to join her voice of denunciation in support of its revolutionary goals.

2. The role of clergy and religious in “politics”

(a) The major role of clergy and religious in the “political” arena in the Philippines has been in justice and human rights. The norms for this role were quoted in “The Church and Human Rights.” The major reasons for active participation in the area of justice and human rights have been:

— the area of human rights is so closely related to the faith (cf. Old Testament prophets) that it is part of the Church’s prophetic role — thus part of the official ministry of the Church.

— it is an area which involved great risks and dangers. To reserve it exclusively for the laity would have exposed them to these grave dangers, while their pastors would have remained relatively safe. It was felt that it was the duty of the pastor (shepherd) to face these dangers too. At times, to face them in place of their sheep.

(b) The more difficult role of clergy and religious in the “political” arena has been in the area of organized political groups. This enters into the area of partisan politics and involvement with ideologies. For some religious groups, this has presented the problem of different and possibly conflicting “centers of obedience.” It is an extremely complex area (involving the kind of formation we give to priests and religious, the psychology of groups, the dynamics of underground parties and united front groups) and cannot possibly be treated here. But it is important to note that it is part of our reality.

3. Church’s presence and identification with different (political) groups

Church officials are often asked for invocations, talks, masses, connected with different social or political groups. The Church has had to find a way between: a desired presence and influence on these groups and the danger of identification or partisanship.

B. The Philippine Church as a Social and Cultural Force.

In a monograph entitled “The Church: A Political Force?” (published as No. 25 of the Human Society monographs of the La Ignaciana
Apostolic Center in Manila). Fr. J.J. Carroll writes:

It would be difficult to deny that the Catholic Church in the Philippines is at least is in a position to be a cultural and social force. By this I mean that it is in a position to influence the culture, values and mentality, concrete judgments and to some extent the social organization of a substantial percentage of the population. More than 80 percent of the population claim membership in the Church, and thus are in contact to a greater or less degree with its message. About 5,000 priests and 7,500 religious sisters and brothers, plus many thousands of lay Church workers are part of what can be seen as a gigantic communications network carrying that message to every province and to the vast majority of towns and barrios of the country. The network includes more than 2,100 parish churches and many times that number of barrio chapels, 41 retreat houses, and more than 2,000 educational institutions ranging from grade schools to universities, with almost 15,000 lay teachers and more than one million students. Sixteen radio stations broadcast under religious auspices, including Radio Veritas in Manila which sprang into prominence at the time of the Aquino assassination. The print media include a number of publishing houses and bookstores run by religious, journals and magazines ranging from the scholarly to the popular, some diocesan newspapers of limited coverage and circulation, a rural mimeograph press operating in about 40 centers, and now Veritas which aspires to become a daily newspaper of general interest published by laymen but sponsored by the Archbishop of Manila.

The Church’s potential as a social force is enhanced by its moral credibility at a time when many other institutions, including the Constitution and the Supreme Court, have been largely discredited; and likewise by the absence of competing organizations in many rural areas, where by default Church personnel have long been involved in health and education programs, community development and organization, and social welfare and relief work.

Thus one might argue that in the case of the Philippines, the role of the Church in the socio-political sphere is determined as well by the responsibility placed on its shoulders by the enormous social and cultural influence which it possesses. This is not simply due to its being Church, but due to its being a very significant force in society. When society’s key values are at stake (as they were in the last many years in the Philippines), all institutions with social and cultural influence have the responsibility to act. It has become apparent in the last many years that the Church is seen by many as the custodian of the nation’s culture and values. To cite just
one example, a recent study of the motivations of the Filipino revolutionaries of 1896 points out that, while the educated leaders were guided by notions of liberty derived from the secular ethos of the French revolution, their peasant followers were guided by notions of kalayaan (freedom-liberation), which derived from the pasyon, the popular chanting of the history of salvation which is a folk liturgy during Holy Week.

1. The Church’s social and cultural institutions: balancing their important role for Church and society against the accommodation needed to preserve them.

(a) Experience of Radio Veritas. After the assassination of Ninoy Aquino, Radio Veritas rose to tremendous prominence in the Philippines as the only voice courageous enough to speak of what was truly going on in the country. This brought great gains of credibility to the Church as the voice of truth. It also brought a lot of pressures on the Church. During the period of the elections, Radio Veritas had to do some difficult balancing decisions: if it spoke too openly, it could be accused of partisanship and closed; if it was too silent, it would lose credibility.

(b) Relationship of Church Officials with Government. The continuation of many Church institutions required dealing with government, e.g., getting the necessary tax exemptions for Radio Veritas equipment, obtaining foreign assistance for schools, etc. If one did not approach the government and request necessary favors, one would lose the chance of important social institutions. If one asked for the favors, on the other hand, this could become a constraint against one’s responsibility to speak or to act in case of injustices in the government. Church officials had to live with the tension of making the necessary dialogue for an important good and, on the other hand, still speaking and acting as required by their conscience and their responsibility.

2. The Role of the Church in the Elections and Revolution. The Church saw its role basically as that of supporting human dignity and freedom by encouraging the emergence of the sovereign will of the people. However, carrying out this surely non-controversial goal was complicated by several factors.

(a) The Church remained the only social institution with a nationwide network which could be an alternative to the public institutions. When the use of these public institutions was denied to Mrs. Aquino (e.g., town plazas, communications systems), the Church institutions in various places became alternatives.
(b) NAMFREL, the volunteer civic organization for clean and free elections, found itself in battle with the COMELEC, the official government body. In its desire to promote clean and free elections, many Church people were with NAMFREL.

(c) With all government media announcing a controlled government line on the results of the elections, only Radio Veritas announced the NAMFREL count. It so happened that Mrs. Aquino was winning in the NAMFREL count and Mr. Marcos in the other counts.

(d) When the government computer technicians walked out to protest what they felt to be manipulation of the count, they turned to the Church for protection and support.

(e) Young reformist military officers (RAM) turned to the Church for support in their own efforts to have the military support clean and free elections (against the moves of some of their senior officers).

Thus, because of its own influence in the social and cultural field and its sense of responsibility in the period of crisis, the Church found itself in confrontation with the Marcos government. This had many good effects: the contribution of the Church to the creation of a democratic center; credibility in the eyes of many Filipinos. It also had effects that needed to be corrected: the disaffection of sincere Filipinos who believed in Mr. Marcos and who blamed the Church for what happened. The concern of people (both friend and foe) that the Church may have (even if in a good cause) become too high profile in the political arena and, therefore, a need to leave this arena to the laity and to move on to its more specific concerns.

3. The Role of the Church in the Present. A meeting of some twenty bishops, March 16-17, 1986, tried to reassess the role of the Church in the changed situation and came out with the concern that the Church may be seen as a power-broker in the new dispensation. Thus, they worked out certain reflections and norms to obviate this danger and yet help to bring about the needed social reforms in the country. Among the principles or norms that came out were:

— The Church must continue to support the people in their efforts at national reconciliation, but in a subsidiary way, as the people were now asserting themselves as responsible citizens.

— In its concern for reconstruction and justice, the Church should turn its attention to the bettering of the economic conditions of the people. This priority is dictated by the urgent need to alleviate hunger and destitution.
— Though receding from its high visibility in the recent past, in its work for justice the Church must continue to fulfill its prophetic role in society. “Critical collaboration” is still a valid and ever applicable principle.

II. THE INVOLVEMENT OF THE LAITY IN POLITICS:
THE CHURCH IN INDONESIA

by
Robert H. Hardawiryana

Introduction

0.1 Our purpose is to highlight the contribution of the Catholic laity in Indonesia, not just generally speaking in the various fields of socio-cultural life, but more specifically in “the difficult but most honorable art of politics” (GS. 75), which, as a matter of fact, are intimately connected with other aspects of life: economic, social, cultural, humanitarian. Our presentation, therefore, is but a partial presentation of the Indonesian Church (most of its members belong to the laity, but the laity is not the entire Church). It is also a partial picture of Christian life in this sense that politics, in which lay people (and actually only a relatively very small number of them) participate, are just one aspect (albeit a very important one) of the entire life of society.

0.2 From that particular point of view — within the perspective of building a genuine particular Church in Indonesia, in other words, in view of having Christian faith truly inculcated by meeting actual challenges of our modern and secularizing world — the focus of our considerations will be: Which Church model would emerge from the actual lay participation in politics practically since the beginning of this century until now?; Which “type of Church” would be appropriate for Indonesia’s future? Again, of course, that would not be the only Church model in Indonesia. But since dialogue with modern human society is a constitutive aspect of the Church’s mission, and in Indonesia, like in many other Asian countries, the area of politics is highly crucial, our reflections may open up new orientations and avenues for the Church’s development in the years to come.

0.3 After a historical overview of the laity’s increasing involvement in politics and of the supporting role of the hierarchy (Chapter I), some ecclesiological reflections on that involvement will be presented, mainly based on experiences of that involvement on the part of the laity as well as of the hierarchy (Chapter II), in order to deepen our insight in Church – State relations within the Indonesian context since early in this century until now, and to enrich our vision of what it is “to be Church in Indonesia
around the year 2000.”

Chapter One: An Historical Overview of Lay Involvement in Politics

1.0 Introduction.

1.0.1 This chapter presents a brief history of Catholic lay involvement in Indonesian politics in four stages: (1.1) the four decades before the proclamation of Indonesia’s national independence (1906-1945); (1.2) the quest for national identity as summarized in the “Pancasila” and the 1945 Constitution as the basis of the Republic (1945-1959); (1.3) efforts to establish the national identity, the transition from the “Old” to the “New Order,” and roughly the first decade of the “New Order” (1959-1980); and (1.4) the response of the Church, particularly of its laity, to challenges of the socio-political situation during the last decade (1980-1990).

1.0.2 It is, of course, impossible to provide a complete picture of Indonesia’s socio-political history from the beginning of this century; nor is it our intention to describe the entire history of the Catholic Mission during the colonial regime, the Japanese occupation, and after the proclamation of independence. We will try to highlight certain important moments of the political involvement of the laity under the guidance and support of the hierarchy within their historical context, so that their relevance for our ecclesiological thinking may stand out as clearly as possible.

1.1 Catholic Leaders during the Struggle for Indonesia’s Independence, 1906-1945

1.1.1 Since the days of St. Francis Xavier until now the role of the laity in developing the Church’s life and mission has become ever more relevant. From the mid-16th century until the 18th century lay activities seem to have focussed on “internal” church growth and to be confined to the Christians themselves, lay catechists playing the main role. But since the early 20th century the Church became aware of its being confronted with new problems in society: nationalist movements, the quest for national identity and for liberation from colonialism and imperialism. These aspirations grew ever stronger in the context of oppressive colonialism which caused the autochthonous population at large to suffer: the minimal daily income of plantation laborers, the scantly livelihood of millions of farmers, the scarcity of school education (which urged the Church to consider education as a high priority), very little opportunity for most of the population to develop themselves and to attain a higher standard of living.
1.1.2 The political atmosphere since early in the 20th century already revealed an ever more intensive quest for national identity and marked trends towards national independence, and Catholic leaders at that time proved to be responsive to those ideals and deeply involved in the national struggle.\(^8\) Whereas in former centuries the struggle against colonialism predominantly had consisted in physical armed resistance in a series of guerrilla and open warfare, since the beginning of the 20th century — with the emergence of the Indonesian intelligentsia — political resistance mostly assumed another strategy: various groups were discussing the situation of oppression, the strength and the weaknesses of the colonialist regime, the relevance of national identity, political ethics, particularly also the cultural roots and the ancient heritage of human and community values.\(^9\)

1.1.3 1906: In his diary Fr. Francis Van Lith, S.J., wrote that the future of the Indonesian Archipelago, of which the island of Java was the center (also in politics and with regard to independence movements),\(^10\) had to be built up by Indonesians themselves; the rights of the autochthonous population had to be safeguarded;\(^11\) thus also Indonesian Catholics themselves would have to be responsible for the future of the Catholic Church in these islands.\(^12\) Already it was quite significant for the Church in mission that a Dutch missionary very strongly supported independence movements.

1.1.4 1908: On May 20 Dr. Doetomo founded the national movement “Boedi Oetomo” in Jakarta.\(^13\) This event has been declared as the birth of national consciousness and appealed to many Catholic laymen interested in socio-politics. On the whole — at the beginning at least — “Boedi Oetomo” tried — not quite successfully — to stay away from radical political trends, and to concentrate on the revaluation of the national culture and on the insertion of modern education and economy.\(^14\) In several “Boedi Oetomo” branches Catholic Javanese were on the board. Yet not all Catholics were satisfied with their membership. Among those who expressed discontentment was F.S. Haryadi, vice chairman of “Boedi Oetomo,” who later on founded the Catholic Party for Javanese.\(^15\) Membership in this movement already meant participation in the struggle for national emancipation. But its Catholic members met with suspicion on the part of the others, Catholicism being considered a religion of the Dutch colonizers: How could Catholics be sincere members of a nationalist movement?\(^16\)

1.1.5 1909: Francis Van Lith, “founder of the Catholic mission in Central Java and pioneer of the emancipation of Catholic Indonesians,”\(^17\) guided by his prophetic vision of the entire political development in the archipelago, founded a Teachers’ Training School in Muntilan, Central
Java, where only very few students were Catholic, and which became a "seminary" for Catholic lay apostles. This institution, together with its sister institution in Mendut, has had a lasting influence on the growth of Catholic communities in many places, even decades after the proclamation of independence in 1945. Since around 1910 an increasing number of Catholic students took up studies in medicine, engineering, civil law, journalism, or opted for positions in the army, at universities, etc.19

1.1.6 1917: The first political activities of Catholics resulted in the setting up of a "Provisional Catholic Committee for Political Action," based on Catholic principles, which in politics aimed at "a participation of the population," commensurate with its development, "in the administration of municipality, region and country," as "a gradual preparation for self-government under one supreme authority with the Netherlands."20 It is beyond doubt that almost from the very outset Catholics took active part in the struggle for national identity, thus testifying to the vitality and the openness of the young Church.

1.1.7 1918: A Supervising Commission on Legislation ("Panitia Peninjauan Perundang-undangan") was established. One of its members, Fr. Van Lith, however, was one of the very few among members of the hierarchy, who were aware of the important role the Church had to play in the development of Indonesian society. More than once the famous Jesuit educator, a man of profound knowledge and sincere love of the Javanese people, a fervent inspirator and motivator of contemporary Catholic lay movements,21 publicly expressed the full support for national independence on the part of the Catholic Church: the interests of the autochthonous population coincided with those of the Catholic Mission; the Church wished to educe the Indonesians so that they would be ready to take full care of their own country; the missionaries wished to mediate between the Dutch government and the Indonesians; but if a conflict would arise they would take sides with the latter.22

1.1.8 A number of Catholic laymen planned to establish a Catholic political party based on the social teaching of the Church. Although they agreed with all indigenous political parties at that time as regards the aim of political independence, they clearly felt the need of a political party founded on Catholic principles of nonviolence, while still recognizing the legitimate government. One of the obstacles, however, was the already existing political party in the East Indies which was controlled by the Dutch, the "Indische Partij," founded in 1911 by Douwes Dekker (Dr. Setyabudi), a grand nephew of the well-known author Multatuli.23

1.1.9 1922: A pamphlet of Fr. Van Lith, addressed to the Indo-Dutch population, declared that the colonial era had come to an end and
Dutch must recognize the rights of the indigenous population, if they wanted their own rights to be recognized; equality of rights, which in the Church has been recognized from the outset, now must become law also outside the Church; Dutch, Indo-Dutch and Javanese should hence forward live together in peace as brothers.\textsuperscript{24}

1.1.10 1923: Fr. Van Lith’s famous pamphlet, which in its final sentences appealed to the Javanese to rally to the support of his ideas on Indonesia’s future,\textsuperscript{25} — in 1930 the pamphlet was even quoted by the young Soekarno in his own defence during his Bandung trial\textsuperscript{26} — became the legitimation for the founding of the “Javanese Catholic Political Party” (Pakempan Politik Katolik Djawi,” PPKD) in August, with about 30 members, all of them alumni of the Teachers’ Training College in Muntiian, Central Java. The party was very simple in its organization (F.S. Harjadi, a headmaster, became chairman; I.J. Kasimo, teacher at an agricultural school, secretary, and R.M. J. Soedjadi, a veterinary surgeon, financial administrator). It aimed at influencing the exercise of public authority, and ultimately at achieving Indonesia’s independence.\textsuperscript{27} It issued three guidelines: 1) it would be a political party based on Catholic principles; 2) it would start its activities originally as a national Javanese party, but with the perspective of becoming a national Indonesian party; 3) it should be “evolutionary,” i.e., it should develop in a programmed and regular way, but at a good pace.\textsuperscript{28}

1.1.11 In 1924 the leaflets of the party on current social and political problems were replaced by the party magazine Suara Katolik (“the Catholic Voice”) which initially was issued as a monthly, but later on became a weekly, and lasted until 1973.\textsuperscript{29} In that year also I.J. Kasimo was elected chairman of the party and stayed in office until 1960, although during the years the name of the party was changed several times.\textsuperscript{30}

Since 1924 there was a delegation from the Catholic Party in the People’s Council (“Volksraad”),\textsuperscript{31} the first Indonesian Catholic delegate being R.M.J. Soedjadi (1924-1927).\textsuperscript{32} The Council dealt with many social problems, e.g., employment / unemployment, the low class of poor farmers, the budget of the Dutch East Indies, education and religion, and, last but not the least, the independence. As long as “the rules of the game” in politics were observed, there needed to be no fear. In the spirit of “democracy” and dialogue any member was free to voice his opinion on any problem, to propose his arguments, even to criticize government policies.\textsuperscript{33}

1.1.12 1925: In order to guarantee that the majority in the people’s Council (at the center as well as in the provinces) would remain in Dutch hands, a new system of election was introduced, i.e., that of separate elec-
torates, under which the Dutch had to vote only for Dutch candidates, the
Indonesians only for Indonesians, and the Easterners (i.e., the Chinese)
only for Easterners. On February 22 the PPKD (since 1925 “Perkumpulan
Politik Katolik di Djawa”) took the decisive and significant step of dis-
sociating itself from the “Indische Katholieke Partij” (a federation which
until then consisted mostly of Dutch member parties in the major cities
and thus — by becoming an independent political party34 — of clearly
testifying to its nationalist ideals and to its readiness to join hands with
other nationalist movements. The local formerly Javanese PPKD party
should assume ever wider dimensions.35

1.1.13 1930: Then the decision was taken to transform the “Catholic
Political Organization in Java” (Perkumpulan Politik Katolik di Djawa,”
PPKD) into an “Indonesian Catholic Political Union” (“Persatuan
Politik Katolik Indonesia,” PPKI). Since then branches were established
in other islands: in Medan (North Sumatra), Ujung Pandang (Selabes)
and other regions.36 It joined the Indonesian Political Federation
(“Gabungan Politik Indonesia,” GAPI)37 which strived for a parliamentary
government,38 and remained active until it was dissolved in 1942
during the Japanese occupation.39

1.1.14 1932: In his speech at the assembly of the People’s Council
(“Volksraad”) I.J. Kasimo, a Catholic leader, echoed the same ideals as
Fr. Van Lith: “I declare herewith that the Indonesian communities, uni-
ited under Dutch authority, have a natural right and duty to cultivate their
own national existence, and that consequently these communities are
entitled to aspire to their own form of government as a means of serving
the nation’s wellbeing according to national needs, i.e., as perfectly as
possible.”40

1.1.15 1941: The “Indonesian Catholic Political Union” already
counted 41 branches in the whole of Indonesia.41 Drastic changes were
introduced with the Japanese invasion: the political atmosphere assumed a
militarist, oppressive character, not seldom marred by acts of violence.
Political organizations were dissolved and replaced by youth organiza-
tions engaged in military training and forced labor.42 Many members of
the clergy and Catholic lay leaders were tortured by the Japanese military
and put into prison.43

During the Japanese occupation, in 1942, all political parties were dis-
solved (although a small nationalist group was tolerated by the Japanese
as a symbol of resistance against Western colonialism, and ready to co-
operate with them),45 and practically all political activity was suspended.
For Catholics it was a matter of survival also as Christians.46
1.2. The Struggle for the National Identity of “Pancasila” and the Proclamation Constitution as the Basis of the Indonesian Republic, 1945–1959

1.2.1 On August 17, 1945, Indonesia’s national independence was officially proclaimed. The Indonesian Republic has been and remains based on the “Pancasila” or “Five Principles,” which contain human and social values rooted in the religious-cultural heritage of Indonesia’s population in the context of the prevailing vision of the salvifying “cosmos” and its fundamental harmony: 1. belief in One Supreme God; 2. a just and civilized humanity; 3. nationalism, the unity of Indonesia; 4. democracy guided by the wisdom of unanimity (“mufakat”) arising from deliberations (“musyawarah”); and 5. social justice for all the Indonesian people. Since the beginning until recently the Church time and again has declared its support for the “Pancasila.”

1.2.2 The new Indonesian government was faced with many practical political problems: a bureaucratic apparatus which was far from being efficient, an inadequate army, very poor financial conditions, and the need to gain international recognition. But the two major problems were:

1) How to integrate the various interests of Indonesian society which is multi-racial, multi-religious and multi-ideological so that all of them would harmoniously converge towards the common prosperity of the nation;

2) How to obtain the necessary means for national development in order to lift up the common standard of life of Indonesia which was known to be largely a poor nation, although in fact rich in natural resources.

1.2.3 The official appointment of the former chairman of the PPKI as a member of the provisional Parliament on August 29, 1945, again proved that Indonesia’s top leaders fully honored the merits of Catholic politicians in obtaining its independence. On December 8 the Catholic Party of the Indonesian Republic (“Partai Katolik Republik Indonesia,” PKRI) was established in Surakarta, Central Java. According to its statutes the party was based on belief in the One Supreme God, and it would dedicate itself fully to the welfare of the Republic guided by Catholic principles.

1.2.4 Within that socio-political context Catholic politicians started to develop channels of their involvement. I.J. Kasimo, the leader of the Catholic Party, became minister and executive in international diplomatic relations, one of the aims being to show that the Indonesian government was not a communist product. On August 15, 1947, he issued a
pamphlet on “The Basis of Our Struggle” (“Dasar-Dasar Perjuangan kita”) explaining the recognition of the Republic “de facto” and “de iure”; nationalism, national life and the right to a national government; the limits of colonialism; disputes between the Indonesians and the Dutch, and the United Nations.57

1.2.5 Catholic politicians played a significant role in the dialogue with the Dutch Catholic Party.58 Several Catholic organizations were established: the “Catholic Youth” (“Pemuda Katolik”), a Catholic students’ organization (“Perhimpunan Mahasiswa Katolik Republik Indonesia,” PMKRI), a Catholic women’s organization (“Wanita Katolik,” WK), a Catholic association of university graduates (“Ikatan Sarjana Katolik”). Catholics have played important roles in the army, in journalism, in sciences,59 in the field of arts,60 in education at university level.61

1.2.6 During the first years of independence the PKRI focussed much of its concern on the unity of the Indonesian people and, therefore, deliberately dissociated itself from movements and parties which contained in themselves seeds of conflict and contention.62 On the other hand, PKRI joined movements promoting unity.63 In the Indonesian context of religious, cultural and social pluriformity which understandably time and again resulted in tensions and even in conflicts, the PKRI’s efforts towards greater national unity is truly relevant as an implementation of its critical function in society at that time.

1.2.7 The Communist rebellion in East Java, known as the “Madiun Event” of 1948,64 impelled Catholic politicians to become anti-communist in a very practical way.65 This had its impact in the common search for an political system based on Indonesian cultural values, and suited for an Indonesian people consisting mainly of the poor rural population with largely a low standard of education and a narrow political vision. The unity of the country at that time was challenged by activities of extreme rightist (Muslim) and extreme leftist groups (like the Communist Party with its atheistic ideology).66

1.2.8 In October 1949, the year of the world recognition of Indonesia’s sovereignty,67 the leadership of PKRI took steps to come into union with 6 Indonesian Catholic political organizations68 established in several not fully independent “states” still under Dutch patronage. The All Indonesian Catholic Congress (“Kongres Umat Katolik Seluruh Indonesia,” KUKSI) took place in Yogyakarta, December 7-12, 1949, and became an encouraging Catholic rally attended by the Pronuncio and Bishop A. Soegijapranata, S.J., as well as by President Soekarno, Vice-President Hatta, and several Cabinet ministers. The 7 parties represented
then decided to form one political party, the “Partai Katolik.”

1.2.9 Together with other political parties and organizations the Catholic Party, officially ratified at its first Congress at Semarang, August 1950, approved Indonesia’s status as a unitary Republic, thus dissolving the former “Federal Republic of Indonesia” (“Republik Indonesia Serikat,” RIS, November 2, 1949-August 17, 1950, result of the Indonesian-Dutch Round Table Conference). F. Haryadi of the Catholic Party became minister of Social Affairs in its first Cabinet. Other members of the “Partai Katolik” were ministers in subsequent Cabinets.

1.2.10 The system of parliamentary democracy around the 1950s proved to be inefficient in building up a national consensus necessary to overcome problems arising from the cultural, religious and ideological plurality. Then the Army proposed the system of “guided democracy,” which was voted against by the “Partai Katolik,” together with Kasimo, with the exception of the Yogyakarta delegates (with Mgr. Soegijapranata), at their Surakarta Congress, July 16-20, 1957. The growing conflict between the Army and the Indonesian Communist Party characterized the political situation towards the end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s.

1.2.11 Among Catholic politicians themselves there was a different vision on strategies, although they claimed to base their insights on Catholic moral teaching.

1) A certain group considered the executive sector of officials as being unable to keep the democratization process moving; there was even a tendency towards a totalitarian regime, because the legislative sector was weakening. Hence, this group took a non-co-operative stance vis-à-vis the government, and went into opposition.

2) Others considered co-operation with the government necessary. Hence they strove for participation in the exercise of legislative and executive authorities, because only thus they could become “salt” in the political world. They tried to co-operate as partners with the government.

The insight of the necessity of creating many channels of political struggle according to Catholic principles of old has been a tradition among Catholic politicians.

1.2.12 An instance of critical co-operation was Kasimo and Muham-
mad Natsir’s (of the “Masyumi”/Muslim Party) opposition against President Soekarno’s concept of a “four-legged” Cabinet consisting of members of the “Masyumi”/Muslim Party, the Muslim Ulama Party (“Nahdatul Ulama,” NU), the Indonesian National Party (“Partai Nasional Indonesia,” PNI) and the Indonesian Communist Party (“Partai Komunis Indonesia,” PKI), introduced on February 21, 1957, in order to create national stability. Kasimo’s reason was the participation of the Communist Party would lead Indonesia towards becoming a Communist state. Since then relations between Soekarno and Kasimo worsened and the latter went into opposition.

1.2.13 From then on the growth of the Catholic Party also was influenced by the Army, which was strongly against the Communist Party and considered the Catholic Church as a reliable stronghold against marxist atheism. That is why the Catholic Party was protected by the Army. Generally speaking, holding on to Christian principles — not without incurring the risks of even constructive criticism! — has been commonly considered as a token of reliability and credibility on the part of Catholic politicians. Considering their small number, it is one of the factors explaining their relatively significant influence in certain instances.

1.2.14 When in November 1956, after general elections, the Constituent Assembly took up the task of formulating definitively the Indonesian Constitution in order to replace the Provisional Constitution of 1950, it appeared that the Assembly was divided into two groups. Half of the Assembly opted for Islam as the foundation of the Republic according to the “Jakarta Charter” (“Piagam Jakarta”), whereas the other half chose the “Pancasila” as the State ideology. Since there was no two-thirds majority and parliamentary democracy did not seem suited for Indonesia, the proposal was made to adopt a system of “Guided Democracy,” and to declare the 1945 Constitution as Indonesia’s definitive Constitution. Since the required majority vote in the Assembly was not attained, the President on July 5, 1959 decreed the 1945 Constitution, once for all, as Indonesia’s authentic and definitive Constitution. Then the Provisional People’s Consultative Assembly (“Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Sementara,” MPRS) was established.

1.2.15 Here we may mention two prominent national leaders and three Catholic national heroes who in a brave struggle during the first two decades upheld Indonesia’s independence:

1. Msgr. Albert Soegijapranata, S.J., since August 1, 1940, Apostolic Vicar and since 1961 Archbishop of Semarang, officially declared a “national hero.” He sought international understanding of political
developments in Indonesia. He wrote an article in the December 1948 issue of the American magazine *Commonweal* explaining that the Dutch blockade also meant “a blockade of ideas” for Indonesia, and that even after the failure of their coup, September 1948, the Communists retained their appeal, and requested the readers to support the new Republic.\(^9\)

2. Ignatius J. Kasimo, a Catholic leader well-known for his integrity,\(^9\) highly respected even among the Dutch as “a serious-minded person, who in spite of a certain affinity with extreme nationalism manages to maintain a standpoint of his own.”\(^9\) After the proclamation of Independence, he became Minister of State in April 1947, and took part in deliberations with the Dutch government,\(^9\) Junior Minister for Welfare in July 1947, Minister for Food Supply in January 1948; Minister of Welfare in mid-1949,\(^9\) and more than once entrusted with a diplomatic mission.\(^9\)

3. Ignatius Slamet Riyadi, colonel of the Indonesian Armed Forces, who died in Ambon on December 23, 1950, while fighting against separatists of the “South Moluccan Republic” (“Republik Maluku Selatan,” RMS).\(^9\)

4. Augustin Adisucipto, Vice Air Commodore and staff member of the Indonesian Air force and pioneer of the Civil Defense Army (“Tentara Keamanan Rakyat,” TKR), whose plane was shot down by the Dutch in Yogyakarta on July 29, 1947.\(^9\)

5. Joseph Sudarso, Rear Admiral of the Indonesian Navy, in 1961 member of the Central Committee of the “Front Nasional.” He died on January 15, 1962, after his boat had been hit by a Dutch torpedo between the North Moluccan Islands and West Irian.\(^9\)

1.3 Catholics in Politics in Indonesia under its “Pancasila” and the Proclamation Constitution, 1959–1980

1.3.1 In 1963 Kasimo also paved the way for the establishment of “Kompas-Gramedia,” now one of the largest printing companies in Indonesia.\(^10\) During that very year it started the issue of the magazine *Intisari* in order to break the isolation of information set at that time by the Communist Party. The daily newspaper *Kompas* was established in June 1965, originally as an organ of the Catholic Party, but later on an independent journal based on Christian humanitarian principles, and today the largest daily spread in Indonesia.\(^10\) The cultural magazine *Basis* adopted a critical stance against Soekarno’s policies at that time.\(^10\) "Sanggar Prathivi" (Radio and Television Fans) was founded in 1966 as one of the main production centers.\(^10\)
1.3.2 Under leadership of Dr. Frans Seda the Catholic Party was in close collaboration with the government and the Army, while holding on to its principle “Salus Populi Suprema Lex.” Among the hierarchy it was Msgr. A. Soegijapranata, S.J. who in a special way supported cooperation with the government. The Apostolic Vicar and since 1961 archbishop of Semarang was on friendly terms with Soekarno and later on declared a national hero by the President for his merits in defending Indonesia’s good reputation before the Dutch government and the international world. Apparently there were differences between the Archbishop and Kasimo, particularly with regard to their attitude towards Soekarno, who towards the end of his regime was considered too closely linked with the Communist movements.

1.3.3 Since the beginning of the “New Order” (“Orde Baru”) after the abortive Communist coup d’état in 1965 (“Gerakan 30 September,” abbrev. G.30.s, literally meaning: the 30th September Movement), and after the Communist Party had been outlawed, Catholic lay politicians generally speaking sought co-operation with the government under President Soeharto’s leadership.

1.3.4 Interreligious tensions also were often intertwined with politics, e.g., the motivations to join the Indonesian National Party (“Partai Nasional Indonesia,” PNI) – as before the coup the Indonesian Communist Party (“Partai Komunis Indonesia,” PKI) – might for quite a few people also be the motivation to join the Catholic Church and Catholic organizations.

1.3.5 Political instability, however, caused by liberalist parliamentary democracy, was a major obstacle to national development, and hence called for political restructuring. Already in 1959 Presidential Decree n. 7, followed by Presidential Regulation n. 13 in 1960, had set conditions for official recognition of political parties. The “Partai Katolik” then had been officially recognized by Presidential Decree n. 128, 1961, on April 14, 1961. But the 10 remaining political parties had not brought much improvement as regards stability. Another reformation had to take place. The new political structures included a further simplification of the Party system on January 10, 1973, the Catholic Party – then under leadership of Dr. Ben Mang Reng Say — together with four other parties amalgamating into the Indonesian Democratic Party (“Partai Demokrasi Indonesia,” PDI).

1.3.6 The tensions among Catholic politicians belonging to different political organizations grew and for the last 25 years they have appeared to be difficult to overcome. A large number of them have taken an independent stance and have been focussing on their profession as their
way of serving Indonesian society, as teachers, businessmen, entrepreneurs, industrialists, editors, journalists, scientists, artists, etc. Generally speaking, this perhaps may be considered a positive sign of a certain maturity of faith among the individuals concerned, and of the vital "missionary" presence of the Church as a whole.

1.3.7 Shortly after the amalgamation into the Indonesian Democratic Party, by which practical political activities of the five former parties concerned were to be co-ordinated, the Kasimo Foundation was established in order to deepen political reflection and to channel "inspirations and aspirations" of Catholics. Membership in the Foundation is open to all lay people seriously concerned with the Catholic cause.

1.3.8 Catholic Politicians in Official Positions

1. In 1960 the "Partai Katolik" nominated as its representatives in Parliament: V.B. Saka, D.S. Matakapan, R.H. Sutarto Hadisudibjo, F.C. Palaunsuka and Frans Seda, whereas I.J. Kasimo was designated as member of the Supreme Advisory Council of State ("Dewan pertimbangan Agung," DPA).


3. At that time B. Mang Reng Say became a member of Parliament replacing Frans Seda who had been appointed minister of Plantations. In 1973 he became member of the Supreme Advisory Council, and in 1975 Ambassador in Lisbon, and in 1976 in Mexico City.

4. In 1973 Seda was appointed Ambassador in Brussels, the first Catholic Ambassador in Indonesia's history (1973-1976), and in 1976 member of the Supreme Advisory Council.


1.4 Challenges of the Socio-Political Situation and the Response of the Catholic Church, 1980-1990

1.4.1 There has been an increasing common awareness that the commitment of Catholics as citizens to the realization of human values as contained in "Pancasila" is truly important. The consciousness is growing that such an involvement is not only the right and duty of any citizen. It is considered more profoundly as a realization of faith to build up humanity according to the spirit of the Gospel.
1.4.2 The problem of Church-State relationships, which since 1924 now and then has come to the fore, was considered more intensively than ever before since IBC 1981, and became the main theme of IBC 1982 and 1984. Information and reflections gathered nation-wide from the various dioceses were integrated in the theme. Here the laity who were involved in the discussions had a very important role to play.

1.4.3 Precisely because of the numerous challenges the Indonesian people are faced with in their efforts for a truly human development in an ever further secularizing world marked by overwhelming technological progress, it is encouraging to know that several times the IBC has been officially invited to contribute its views and suggestions with regard to serious human and social problems at the national level. Thus, e.g., the insights of Catholic politicians based on Christian principles have found their way to the concept of the “Guidelines of State Policy” (“Garis-Garis Besar Haluan Negara,” GBHN) to be officially approved by the People’s Consultative Assembly (“Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat”) respectively in 1983 and 1988. IBC 1988 took up for discussion several points of the newly decreed “Guidelines.”

1.4.4 The “Bill on Organizations in Society,” taking the “Pancasila” as the one and only juridical basis for any such organization, expressed the government’s expectation of facilitating co-operation with mass organizations, but also with religious groups, concerning political efforts particularly on behalf of political stability and security for the sake of national development. For purposes of deliberation and co-operation the government needs political partners that could represent the various religious groupings. But this law presented the Indonesian Church with a quite arduous problem. The impact this law could have on various aspects of Christian life, especially on the IBC itself as a Conference, on its Commissions and Institutions, but also on (other) Catholic organizations, was carefully studied during IBC 1983, 1984 and 1985. The IBC’s conclusions on the matter were submitted to the government as its contribution towards formulating the law (IBC 1984).

1.4.5 Religious instruction in schools has always been a difficult problem with political implications (among others) affecting the principle of religious freedom — which State and society are obliged to assure (cf. DH 6) — and the relationship between the government and the hierarchy. In principle the government respects and guarantees the right of private institutions to engage in school education according to their particular principles. In practice, however, up to now many difficulties still occur in maintaining that freedom. Together with the National Association of Catholic Education (“Majelis Nasional Pendidikan Katolik,” MNPK), in which a good number of lay people are actively in-
volved, the Commission on Catechetics has taken action against school exams on Catholic Religion organized by the Department of Education and Culture. The Commission has appointed an official in charge of relationships, particularly with the Department of Religious Affairs, in order to monitor government programs with regard to religious propagation, religious instruction, teachers of religion, etc., so that whenever problems arise, immediate and appropriate action can be taken.

1.4.6 Another problem, which affects the “image” of the Church in Indonesia’s plurireligious context, especially with regard to Islam, and which also has a political aspect, ought to be mentioned. Although during his recent visit to Indonesia Pope John Paul II praised Indonesia’s interreligious tolerance based on “Pancasila,” his appeal for religious freedom and continuous interreligious dialogue in his address to religious leaders in Jakarta was equally significant. Following decrees nos. 70 and 77/1978 of the Department of Religious Affairs and decree n. 1/1979 of the Departments of Religions, Foreign and Home Affairs, negotiations were held between IBC (in cooperation with the Indonesian Council of Churches) and the government. Since 1980 the problem of foreign missionaries has become increasingly difficult. Since 1986 the Indonesian government has put restrictions on the stay of foreign missionary holders of a temporary visa or of a temporary permission to enter Indonesia (“Kartu Izin Masuk Sementara,” KIMS), who have stayed in Indonesia for over 10 years. If they still wish to work in Indonesia, they may apply for Indonesian citizenship.

With regard to interreligious dialogue we note that there is in the Catholic Church a severe shortage of experts on Islam. IBC 1966 urged the bishops to pay attention to the education of such scholars. Among the very few Catholic publications on Islam may be mentioned Dr. Niti Gandha, Marilah Berdialog (Bogor 1971).

1.4.7 Animated parliamentary discussions in 1989 around the Bill on “the Religious (i.e., Muslim) Judiciary System” (“Rencana Undang-Undang Peradilan Agama”), and debates on religious instruction in schools, in which Catholic politicians played an important role, make us aware that we are to be on our guard against still lingering trends towards the establishing of a Muslim state based on the “Jakarta Charter” and against infringements of democratic rights and religious freedom. Pope John Paul II’s address in Jakarta during his recent visit to Indonesia, October 9-14, 1989, may be considered as a public support of the Catholic stance with regard to “Pancasila.”

1.4.8 Catholic-Muslim co-operation exists in the social fields; e.g., in Catholic hospitals Catholic and Muslim physicians and nurses can co-
operate harmoniously in serving the health of the people. There is cooperation also in the Conference of Private Schools ("Musyawarah Perguruan Swastya," MPS) between educational organizations of Muslims ("Muhammadiyah"), nationalist ("Taman Siswa"), Protestants and Catholics.\textsuperscript{138}

Chapter Two: Ecclesiological Reflections

2.0 Introduction

2.0.1 It is not easy to trace back to what extent documents of the Magisterium concerning socio-political life\textsuperscript{139} have influenced Catholic politicians and the laity in general in their involvement in Indonesia’s struggle for independence and national identity. It appears that generally speaking they have been motivated by “Christian principles,” and that they have considered this as their distinctive contribution to Indonesia’s independence and development towards ever greater prosperity. “Christian principles” also seem to have enlightened them in taking a critical prophetical stance towards situations and events.

2.0.2 It is the more interesting to observe how — perhaps without any “systematic” frame of reflection and almost spontaneously — they have themselves tried to motivate and justify their political viewpoints and actions in the light of Christian conscience and guided by the hierarchy, and how they have obtained valuable insights about their mission in secular society. The wealth of their experiences promises to enrich contextual theological reflection on the political role of the Indonesian Catholic community. Their own faith reflections, therefore, as far as reflected and at times formulated along with their political activities, deserve to be given priority, and will serve as a continuous frame of reference for further ecclesiological reflection.

2.03 The pastoral guidance of the hierarchy, particularly as provided by pastoral letters and/or decisions of the Indonesian Bishops’ Conference, may to a certain extent complete our “image” of the Indonesian Church, the Church model which — from the viewpoint of political involvement — seems appropriate for our situation. The Church as institution, however, does not lay claim to social competence or political position, because it is not sent for that purpose.

2.1 The Role of the Laity in Politics

2.1.1 The fact that early in this century Dutch Catholics had practically nothing to say in the government of the Dutch East Indies emphasizes the more strongly that it was practically only the group of Catholic lay
politicians at that time which elaborated the Church's role in society. The transformation of the “Catholic Political Party in Java” (PPKD) into the “Indonesian Catholic Political Union” (PPKI) in 1930 and its intensive participation in the struggle for independence especially under I.J. Kasimo turned out to be of no small importance for the future of the Church in Indonesia.

2.1.2 The PPKI’s further development had in itself a missionary impact: the Catholic Church became ever better and ever more widely known by its growing commitment to the quest for national identity and by its involvement in the development of society; it was well under way to becoming a Church in whose mission in secular society the laity played their rightful role. During the period 1950-1959 the influence of the Partai Katolik and of Catholics in general was in several fields of life in society much greater than could be expected from their small number (2 million). In Indonesia it is important to seek for ways of effectively helping society at large become ever more critical of the situation and exercise ever better their duty and right of social control. The Church's evangelizing mission and the good example of Christians may help people grow in genuine freedom and political responsibility.

2.1.3 Catholic leaders inspired and animated by Christian faith so far have been and will continue to be deeply committed to the formation of a healthy public view on politics suited to the particular genius of our people. They have had an important share in political decision making during the struggle for national independence and the subsequent building up of the country’s prosperity based on Indonesia’s Constitution of 1945 and on the “Pancasila” State Ideology. Ever since Indonesia became independent Catholics have contributed their insights on social and political life in the context of innate socio-cultural values in order to enrich the understanding of “Pancasila,” and — wherever need be — to correct interpretations that cannot be reconciled with respect for human dignity. Competent and principled lay people are to influence from within the philosophies, programs and activities of political parties and personalities for the common good in the light of the Gospel.

2.1.4 A healthy political view, genuine freedom and political responsibility include the consciousness of being called to be “salt to the world” (Mt 5:13). Generally speaking, the Church, and at the forefront Catholic lay politicians, implement their prophetic role whenever, incurring all risks, they enter the concrete place and moment of struggle for justice by articulating Christian principles in constructive criticism, justified expectations and concrete demands. Yet it is for Catholic politicians by no means easy not just to maintain “friendly” relations with those in power, but to carry out their prophetic function by taking a courageous
critical stance, and to co-operate critically (in the constructive sense) with common efforts for development. A highly important question in Indonesia is indeed: In what way can they best act prophetically? It is a difficult question also, because it is not always clear which norms are concretely applied by government officials in judging whether and to what extent something goes contrary to the so called “national stability and security necessary for national development.” The unofficial approach of “lobbying” with government officials in many cases has proved to offer in the long run better results than openly launching criticism.

2.1.5 The small group of Catholic leaders inspired by the socio-political vision of Fr. Van Lith mostly have stressed socio-political involvement as an integral aspect of their Christian faith, and as alumni of Muntian's Teachers' Training College were convinced that if the Catholic Mission was to succeed, the government should guarantee the fundamental rights to freedom: religious freedom, freedom to receive due education, freedom to enjoy social services (like health services). It ought to be a government which continually developed itself and was well controlled in its political struggle; a government deeply concerned with the common welfare, with justice and the rights of the individual. Involvement of Catholics in matters of legislation, so that this be inspired by charity, prudence and the spirit of service to the common welfare, is considered of paramount importance.

2.1.6 On the other hand, during more than four subsequent decades among the large majority in the Church (including the clergy) the emphasis on particular Catholic interests (schools, health services, etc.), and more specifically on the religious spiritual aspect of Christian life, seems to have been predominant. The “Action Guidelines for Indonesian Catholics,” issued by the Indonesian Bishops' Conference in 1970, were of particular importance as heralding the increasing emphasis on socio-political involvement among ever larger sections of the Catholic population, especially among the Catholic intelligentsia. Even until now tensions about the “religious spiritual accent” and the “secular social emphasis” in Christian life have remained a matter of animated discussion in certain circles.

2.1.7 The impact of political endeavors of Catholic lay people has been and still is felt by society at large in the various fields of national development: education, health service and other social services, mass communication, science, and technology. The time has come to reformulate in the light of Christian faith the meaning of political involvement, and this task primarily pertains to the laity who are directly involved. Christian values started gaining recognition as an important factor in deepening the “Pancasila” ideology, in establishing social justice and de-
fending human rights. The task of building up a humanitarian political culture should be continued. By certain groups, however, it is regretted that — due to the simplification of political structures initiated in 1973 — as yet there is no Catholic political organization which can channel the idealism and the political aspirations of the younger generation of Catholics, especially of those who have gained important positions in the field of their profession in which they could live their social responsibility.

2.1.8 The fundamental position of the Church towards the State (political power, political structures) is a balance between autonomy and co-operation (cf. GS 76; DH 7). Church-State relationships are an integral part of the dialogue between Church and world. Man lives that dialogue first in his very own self, since he is “Church” as a believer who expresses his faith relationship with God in Jesus Christ; at the same time he is “world” to the extent that he lives out his autonomy in laboring and living in society. While staying in relationship with God, he lives that relationship among others through his political responsibility.

2.1.9 The “Pancasila” contains human values highly regarded by the Catholic Church. Hence for Catholics involved in social and political problems the defence and the practice of “Pancasila” and the 1945 Constitution “may be considered a realization of Christian faith within the context of Indonesian society.” It is to be noted, however, that — contrary perhaps to the trend of “politicizing” almost everything in Indonesia — the Church asserts the autonomy of the cultural and social dimensions (from being reduced to the political). This is important since the Church has the right to engage in cultural and social institutions, in the transformation of society.

2.1.10 Christian faith has its real impact on the social and political fields through the responsible actions of individual members of the Church. Of course, all social and political endeavors ought to be “concerted action,” but action in togetherness based formally on the same civil obligations, in the context of the same life environment (thus also, based on the same “Pancasila” as the Constitutional foundation of the Indonesian Republic), not formally based on the same faith and religion. Hence, in Indonesia Catholics can co-operate closely with all people of good will, with adherents of whatever religion or faith, in striving for a prosperous Indonesian society. In that activity they can live their faith. Whether there should be Catholic social institutions, Catholic labor organizations, Catholic students’ groups, a Catholic political party, properly speaking, is not a matter of theology, but of practical political consideration.

2.1.11 As a “Pancasila” State, with belief in the One Supreme God
being the first “Sila,” the Indonesian Republic cannot be merely (passively) neutral or tolerant in matters of religion. Recognition of the role of religions in the Republic is considered fundamental for its existence. Hence, it is important that the State and its government pay attention to the religions, particularly in view of “interreligious solidarity.” It may be said that the Indonesian State has a particular obligation towards religions to promote social peace for the sake of common welfare. To the Church, however, “interreligious solidarity” is not merely a matter of strategy or politics in view of common wellbeing. It expresses at the same time a deep respect for people of other faiths, and creates an atmosphere of freedom and mutual trust, in which man can respond to God’s call. It also reflects a deep reverence to God’s all encompassing sovereignty and mercy.

2.1.12 Appropriate for the Indonesian situation is what the Asian Colloquium on Ministries in the Church, Hong Kong 1977, considers as a challenge to the Church in politics, i.e., “how to help our people find an Asian style of authentic participative leadership in government at all levels.”

2.2 The Pastoral Guidance of the Hierarchy in Politics

2.2.1 A message of Msgr. A. Soegijapranata, S.J., delivered in 1953 in commemoration of the “three decades of Catholic political movement in Indonesia,” confirmed the “Partai Katolik” as the only political party established with the approval of the Bishops’ Conference (IBC), and acknowledged its valuable contribution to the Church and to Indonesian society at large. The bishop urged the faithful to support the Party especially during the political struggle, in order to save the “Pancasila” as Indonesia’s State ideology, while upholding Catholic principles.

2.2.2 After the dissolution of the Parliament elected by the people (1960), the Central Committee of the IBC issued an appraisal of the new political situation. Its statement did not express approval or disapproval of the new form of government, because “the Church can co-operate with any form of government, as long as fundamental rights of belief in God and humanity are respected, and people are not pressured into a society of materialism and atheist.”

2.2.3 In 1963 the bishops of Irian Jaya issued a special pastoral letter for the benefit of Catholics under their jurisdiction. In line with the other Indonesian bishops they accepted the Pancasila, and expressed confidence in the government. “The present government of Indonesia under its President is a legally established government, which must be recognized and respected.”
2.2.4 After the abortive Communist coup in 1965, known as “the Action of September 30th” (“Gerakan 30 September,” G.30.S.) the Central Committee of the IBC wrote a pastoral letter deploiring the event. The principle aim of political organizations should be “not just to benefit the individual members, or even the interests of the particular group; nor to open the way for political factor in the achievement of Nationhood ... The purpose of any state is to promote the general welfare of its own people ... There is no place for such terms as ‘majority’ or ‘minority’ if this means the suppression of others ... All (people, religions) should have an honored place in our state, based on Pancasila.”\(^{170}\)

2.2.5 IBC 1966 issued a pastoral letter “to all those throughout the areas of Indonesia who embrace a society that is just and prosperous, both material and spiritual; and especially to our beloved Catholics” (note the nation-wide scope!) welcoming the decisions of the Provisional Constituent Assembly of 1966 which “proved the sincere desire ... to improve the socio-economic life of the people, according to national aspirations.”\(^{171}\)

2.2.6 During the period of 1968 – 1978 the bishops supported every effort of Catholics in order to realize development programs in every field, especially the “Five-Years’ Development Plans” (“Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun,” Repelita), in accordance with the social encyclicals, especially of John XXIII and Paul VI, and with the teaching of Vatican II. Particularly is to be mentioned the “Action Guidelines for Catholic Indonesians.”\(^{172}\)

2.2.7 In politics the bishops not only supported the “Partai Katolik,” but also found it expedient for Catholics to enroll in other political parties, especially the “Functional Groups” (“Golongan Karya,” Golkar).\(^{173}\)

2.2.8 In 1971 the Presidium of the IBC issued a declaration on the general elections stating that the government was obliged to carry out the general elections with due respect to such essential elements as freedom and secrecy; it should restrain all sorts of intimidation or threats from whatever source, and all forms of manipulation.\(^{174}\)

2.2.9 IBC 1976 issued a pastoral letter on the general elections to be held on May 2, 1977, reflecting the attitude in principle of the hierarchy regarding the position of Catholics in the “New Order” era. In elections Catholics “do not act in the name of the Church as directly under the leadership of the hierarchy, or even for the glory of the Church,” but they exercise their rights as individual citizens for the interests of the nation, according to personal convictions; they are to choose a party or group which in their judgement is competent and willing to serve the good of
society as a whole.\textsuperscript{175} The letter stressed both the right and duty to take part in the elections, and at the same time the freedom to vote for one party or for none at all in a responsible way (considering party politics at that time).

Practically the letter reflects the doctrine of GS 75-76 on the role of Christians in politics, and on the Church and politics.\textsuperscript{176} On account of its limitations,\textsuperscript{177} however, the Pastoral Constitution makes us raise the hermeneutical question whether the teaching particularly on the clear distinction between State and Church somewhere would not need some "relativizing," and how we from within the traditional Indonesian cosmic world view, according to which cultural life in society is wholly permeated with religious values, should interpret and "apply" it to our situation.

2.2.10 In addition IBC 1976 issued its response to "Developments in State and Society," of which a critical analysis was given, underlining the importance of the principle of democracy, the proper functioning of state institutions, equality of rights and opportunities for all groups, the duty of judiciary institutions, the role of education, including private education; it wished the dignity of the human person to be emphasized.\textsuperscript{178}

In order to explain the rights and duties of the faithful as citizens and to warn them for certain abuses, also in 1981 and 1986 IBC issued a pastoral letter on the general elections.

2.2.11 As a result of discussions at IBC 1982 guidelines were issued in 1985 on the relationship between Church and State entitled "Indonesian Catholics in Pancasila Society."\textsuperscript{179} Indeed, if cannot be emphasized strongly enough how important the role of the laity is in politics.

Since the Church cannot offer social, political or economic solutions to problems of development in general and of politics in particular, it cannot provide politicians, not even Catholics among them, with guidelines or directives as to which concrete policies to take.\textsuperscript{180} Its task is to apply God's word to peoples' lives and the life of society by offering principles for reflection, criteria of judgement and directives for action,\textsuperscript{181} not in the sense of concrete guidelines, nor — on the other hand — of merely general ethical principles for life in society (i.e., applicable everywhere and at all times), but directives in a concrete historical situation, formulating man's responsibilities in community life. Even without being directly or concretely operational those principles concern actual problems, and are to be formulated in a way understandable for contemporary man.\textsuperscript{182} It is the local congregation of faithful, i.e., the laity, who in their concrete life situations have to discern God's will concerning their local political cir-
cumstances, officially through their bishop, unofficially — and this is no less important — by all expressions of their awareness and the promptings of the Spirit in them.\textsuperscript{183}

\section*{Conclusions — Some Suggestions for the Future}

\subsection*{1.0 Church Model: The “Servant” Church}

1.1 At a reception hosted by President Soeharto at the State Palace in his honor, Pope John Paul II said: “I was pleased to learn of the contributions which the Indonesian Catholics have made since the beginning of the Republic, and they are continuing to contribute to the advancement of the nation.”\textsuperscript{184}

1.2 The contribution of the Catholic laity in independence movements since early in this century, during the physical revolution, and since the proclamation of Indonesia’s independence in 1945, towards an ever greater common welfare of Indonesia, particularly in the political field, has rightly been acknowledged and appreciated by the Indonesian government and by the people.\textsuperscript{185} It is considered as an important aspect in the implementation of the Gospel message with regard to the common wellbeing of our people, and by and large acknowledged as far more significant than the number of Catholics would warrant.

1.3 Even long before Vatican II the critical-prophetical constructive involvement of the Catholic laity in Indonesian society reflected very much the image of a Church in dialogue with the world as presented in the Pastoral Constitution \textit{Gaudium et Spes}, a Church at the service of a Nation in its quest for national identity, in its struggle for independence and integral human development, a “Servant Church,”\textsuperscript{186} considering itself as part of the total human family, sharing the same concerns as the rest of men,” and — just as Christ came into the world not to be served but to serve — seeking to serve the world by fostering brotherhood.\textsuperscript{187}

1.4 Accordingly, the method of faith reflection adopted by those involved in socio-political activities mostly seems to be “secular-dialogic”: “secular, because the Church takes the world as a properly theological locus, and seeks to discern the signs of the times; “dialogic,” because it seeks to operate on the frontier between the contemporary world and the Christian tradition (including the Bible), rather than simply apply the latter as a measure of the former.”\textsuperscript{188}

1.5 Through its laity involved in socio-political problems the Catholic Church in Indonesia is implementing the mission of the Church according to Vatican II; i.e.,
1. the mission of sharing — in genuine and deeply felt solidarity — in the joys and sufferings, the hopes and anxieties of the Indonesian people (GS 1);

2. the mission of putting Christian faith into effect in all aspects of life, so that it becomes incarnate in the secular world, in their political activities also; 189

3. the mission of being present within society and of promoting the values of truth, goodness and holiness in all aspects of life, including the political field. 190

2.0 Perspectives for Future Lay Involvement in Politics

2.1 In its chapter on “the Life of the Political Community” Vatican II’s Pastoral Constitution invites all Christians to “appreciate their special and personal vocation in the political community. This vocation requires that they give conspicuous example of devotion to the sense of duty and of service to the advancement of the common good.” The emphasis on the supreme necessity of civic and political education for the people, “so that all citizens can make their contribution to the political community” (GS 75) is truly meaningful for the future of Indonesia.

2.2 As already said, the Indonesian Church is called to be a “counterstructure” in society, implementing its prophetic and critical function in a constructive way. Lay experts in human and social sciences are to conduct scientific researches and to assist by their interdisciplinary approach the Church in keeping pace with developments in society, in forming an accurate judgement on current situations and events, in taking — by deliberation in a spirit of prayerful discernment — a responsible and resolute position while coping with emerging problems, not the least in politics. They are to help the Church in attaining well justified policies and strategies particularly in this important aspect of its pastoral ministry.

2.3 The Church ought not to act merely in reaction to situations and events, and thus by “running after them” and “trying to make the best of them” miss many valuable chances of constructive involvement in the process of Indonesia’s national development. But by the “ministry” of Catholic-principled politicians the Church ought to try as best it can to take up a leading position (not, however, in the secular political sense!), by anticipating as far as possible challenges to come, prepared to respond to them by conveying — through those politicians — inspiration and motivations even and not the least to those in political power, in gearing common endeavors in society towards authentic human progress. Politicians and other “academici” need a forum to discuss socio-political issues in the light of faith. 191
2.4 For an ever fuller involvement of the Church in efforts for integral human development, particularly also in the political field, a sufficient number of Christians need to prepare themselves properly for their "most honorable" vocation in society.\(^2\) Not only are they, as individuals or joined together in groups, to be encouraged to keep up with political developments at national and regional levels within the context of international political relationships. They also need to know what the Church in general and the Indonesian Church in particular has to say with regard to politics, and to draw the more practical conclusions and implications for the Indonesian situation, and thus make their valuable contribution towards an ever more responsible administration of State affairs and an ever healthier common political life.

2.5 Last but not least, in order to be faithful to its vocation as sacrament of salvation and as sign of God's Kingdom through its committed involvement in the ongoing modernity process of Indonesian society, the Church in its entirety is to live and continuously renew its Christian faith so that this becomes truly relevant as the inspiring and animating force of a truly human advancement. This is of the highest importance especially to counter negative aspects of the secularization process that almost inevitably go together with scientific and technological progress. The involvement of the Catholic laity in national development, not the least in the crucial but in many respects decisive area of politics, aiming at the integral wellbeing of human society and of all its members, should help all, Christians and adherents of other faiths alike, recognize the loving and provident care of the Father who in Jesus Christ his Son wishes to save humanity, and in his Spirit will bring his salvific plan to its glorious eschatological fulfillment, in "a new heaven and a new earth" (Rev 21:1).
FOOTNOTES


4. See also the “Summary of the period 1908-1945” in Muskens 1979, pp. 168-169.

5. See Muskens’ overview on the presence of Christians in Sumatera, VIth – XVth centuries, on the Catholic Church under Portuguese and Spanish flags, and on the development of the Church in the XIXth century, Muskens 1979, pp. 38-47.


9. Yayasan Kasimo, p. 20; events like the victory of the Japanese navy over the Russians in 1905 seem to have inspired independence movements at that time: a victory of an Asian nation over a Western military power!


13. Literally “Noble Endeavor;” the association devoted itself to the availability of education in Dutch and of education in general to far larger groups of the population (and hence originally was not merely political); Tjipto Mangunkusumo’s group wanted to turn “Budi Utomo” into a purely political organization, and when he failed he joined the “Indische Partij” founded in 1911; in 1918 “Budi Utomo” changed its name to “Jong Java,” and its purpose became: the unity of greater Java; Sartono CS V, pp. 181-187; Muskens 1979, pp. 36-58, 123-128; Department of Information RI, “Indonesia 1989. And Official Handbook,” Jakarta: Percetakan Negara RI 1988/1989, p. 41; Darmatmadja, 1989, p. 6.


18. Yayasan Kasimo, p. 18. A similar institution was established in Mendut, not far from Muntilan, for girls, under direction of the Franciscan Sisters of Heytheuizen.


23. Dr. Tjipto Mangunkusumo and Ki Hajar Dewantoro (the famous leader of the “Taman Siswa” nationalist movement) were co-founders; Sartono CS, V, pp. 189-193; Handbook, p. 41; Muskens 1979, p. 130; Yayasan Kasimo, p. 22. On “Taman Siswa”: Sartono CS, V, pp. 250-263.


25. “If your approval lends force to my weak voice, I have no doubt that it will shake up the entire Dutch nation and gain you what your soul is longing for: that Java, grown and developed into the Indies, the whole Nusantara (archipelago), will live its golden age again and, reborn in the end, resume its place in the family of the nations,” Muskens 1979, p. 139.


27. Kasimo, p. 43. Fundamentally the newly established Catholic Party pursued the same ideals as other political organizations at that time, the “Budi Utomo” and the “Centrale Sarekat Islam” (Central Muslim Organization), without however explicitly mentioning in their statutes Indonesia’s independence as their ideal, p. 45.


30. Ibid.

31. Opened on May 21, 1918, as an advisory organ for the governor general, with representatives of the autochthonous populace and of the Dutch in the Indies, Muskens 1979, p 134. The “Volksraad” later developed into a semi-legislative assembly; among its members were prominent nationalist leaders, Handbook, p. 42.


34. Muskens 1979, p. 140; Kasimo, pp. 45-47.


37. Founded in May 1939, this political association did not aim openly at an independent Indonesia but, cautiously and rather vaguely worded, at the unification of all political parties for the sake of mutual co-operation; Kartono CS, V, pp. 235-240; Muskens 1979, p. 155; also p. 164; Handbook, p. 44.

38. GAPI proposed to the Dutch government to give Indonesia a parliament of its own, and in 1939 actions were organized to support it; in 1941 it proposed in a memorandum a Dutch – Indonesian federation; Muskens 1979, p. 156; Kasimo, p.49.


41. Yayasan Kasimo, p. 25.

42. Sartono CS, VI, pp. 125-131.

43. So was KASIMO, because he had been member of the Council of People’s Representatives, ally of the Dutch, and adherent of a foreign religion, Yayasan Kasimo, p. 27.


45. Sartono CS, VI, 157-170.

46. Yayasan Kasimo, ibid.

47. On the period of struggle for independence: the initial struggle, first struggle against the Dutch army, suppression of the insurrection of the Indonesian Communist Party, confrontation with the second military action of the Dutch, Sartono CS, VI, pp. 29-72.

48. Sartono CS, VI, pp. 27-28; Handbook, p. 45. The next day, August 18, the Constitution was adopted as the basic law of the country; Sartono CS, VI, p. 29.


50. On “Pancasila Democracy,” i.e., “democracy based on the people’s sovereignty which is inspired by and integrated with the other principles of Pancasila,” and its development from 1945 until now, cf. Handbook, pp. 55-57.


53. Yayasan Kasimo, p. 28.

54. Kasimo, p. 50.


59. E.g., W.J.S. Purwadarminta, Kamus Urum Bahasa Indonesia; Prof Dr. Slamet Mulyono: publications on Indonesian language and history, Prof Dr. Sartono Kartodirdjo: historiography; cf. Muskens 1979, p. 114.


61. Yayasan Kasimo, p. 29.


63. Kasimo, p. 53.

65. This strongly anti-communist attitude was confirmed 7 years later in a declaration of the Indonesian Bishops’ Conference, October 25 – November 2, 1955, signed by Msgr. A. Soegiaprana, S.J., on behalf of the other bishops; Muskens 1979, p. 246.


68. I.e., 1) Pemakat (Permasyawaratan Majelis Katolik) in the Minahasa (North
Sulawesi), 2) Parkit (Partai Katolik Indonesia Timor) in Timor, 3) Perpokaf
(Persatuan Politik Katolik Flores) in Flores, 4) Partai Katolik Rakyat Indonesia in
Flores, 5) Partai Katolik Rakyat Indonesia in Makasar, and 6) Parkika (Partai
Katolik Indonesia Kalimantan) in Kalimantan; cf. Kasimo, p. 56; cf. Muskens 1979,
p. 203.

69. Kasimo, pp. 57-58; Muskens 1979, pp. 202-203. Resolutions besides the establish-
ment of the “Partai Katolik”: that of organizations for Catholic laborers, for Catholic
women and for the Catholic youth; the wish for Soekarno’s appointment as President
of “the Republic of the United States of Indonesia;” ibid.

70. Muskens 1979, p. 245.

71. Muskens 1979, p. 204. Article 2 of the Statutes: (1) “The Partai Katolik is based on
belief in God in general, and on Pancasila in particular, and operates according to
Catholic principles”; (2) “The Partai Katolik has as objective: to work for the pro-
gress of the Republic of Indonesia and the welfare of its people.”

72. Sartono CS, VI, pp. 72-80; 238; Handbook, p. 47.


74. E.g., Ir. Soewarto (Agriculture, April 1951 – February 1952; Public Works, April
1952 – June 1953), I.J. Kasimo (Economic Affairs, August 1955 – March 1956), Prof.
Soehardi S.H. (Agriculture, 1956), A. De Rozari (vice minister of Communications,
1956); Muskens 1979, pp. 243 and 247; cf. Kasimo, p. 60.

75. On the period of “liberal democracy”: Sartono CS, VI, pp. 73-100; conflicts were
almost rampant because people adhered to political parties according to religion and
culture, and also because of tensions between “the Islam State” and “the Pancasila
State,” January – August 1953; in the context of increasing tensions general elections
were held in 1955; Muskens 1979, pp. 207-221. Indonesian democracy may not
simple be judged according to the norms of “Western” democracy, Hardawiyana
1989a, n. 1.8.4, p. 10; Commans CS, p. 63.

76. On the period of “guided democracy”: Sartono CS, VI, pp. 100-123; also: Muskens


80. Kasimo, p. 61.

81. Yayasan Kasimo, p. 31. Another example: Kasimo’s (and most of the Catholic Party’s)
opposition to Soekarno’s proposal of guided democracy; Muskens 1979, p. 247.

82. Yayasan Kasimo mentioned especially the leadership of Pius XII, p. 31.

83. Ibid.

84. General elections were first held on September 29, 1955 (political parties) and
December 15 of that year (election of members of the Constituent Assembly),
Sartono CS, VI, pp. 94; 250-254.


87. On "Guided Democracy" ("demokrasi terzimpin"), 1959-1966, see Sartono CS, VI, pp. 100-123; EP4, III, pp. 294-295. A description is found in Muskens 1979; "the key ingredient is leadership. After hearing the general views and contra views, the Guided summarizes the points into a compromise palatable to each faction. Not one side wins totally to the exclusion of the others. Only strong leadership is capable of synthesizing the final decision; otherwise the system will not work," pp. 250-251.


89. Kasimo, pp. 62-64.


91. Muskens 1979, p. 201. The bishop's ideas about the policy of America and the Netherlands, that of Soekarno, and about International Catholic Aid Organizations were expressed in an interview in the News Service of the National Catholic Welfare Conference in America, and later taken over by the world press; Muskens 1979 pp. 247-248.


94. E.g., at the Linggarjati conference, November 1946; Muskens 1979, p. 200. The PKRI eventually accepted the Linggarjati Agreement, because it "would bring the Republic safety and independence, provided there was no evil intention from the people who would carry it out," p. 199.


96. E.g., in 1950 (the Netherlands), in December 1955—January 1956 (Geneva) on the integration of Irian Jaya, Kasimo, pp. 64-65.


100. P.K. Ojong and Jakob Oetomo, both together with Kasimo, members of the
Catholic Party's central governing board, were two prominent leaders of the company. Cf. Muskens 1979, p. 305.

101. Yayasan Kasimo, p. 32.

102. Together with Dick Hartoko, chief editor of Basis, André Hardjiana signed the Cultural Manifesto (“Manifesto Kebudayaan”) which insisted that the essence of culture should not be subjected to political interests; text and commentary cf. Basis XIII (1963-1964) pp. 65-71: “Sekitar Manifes Kebudayaan;” the Cultural Manifest was banned on May 8, 1964 as “incompatible with the revolution;” Muskens 1979, pp. 270-271.

103. Other Catholic production centers: Palembang and Ujung Pandang, especially meant to address local situations, and often broadcasting in local languages; Muskens 1979, pp. 304-305; on the role of mass media (television, micro-wave, communication satellite “Palapa”) as a unifying factor of Indonesia: Coomans CS, p. 62.


105. Yayasan Kasimo, p. 32.


109. According to B. Anderson in 1964 Javanese conversions to the Catholic Church “provides a thoroughly respectable pretext for fending off the political, social and moral claims made by orthodox Islam,” Muskens 1979, p. 108.


112. Kasimo, p. 66.


114. Yayasan Kasimo, p. 33.

115. Yayasan Kasimo, p. 33.


120. Muskens 1979, p. 303.

121. Report IBC, n. 2.2.1., p. 21.


125. Cf. Report IBC, n. 2.2.4., p. 21. IBC’s structures and organization (its Statutes, the Directories of its apparatus) were thoroughly revised (among others with regard to the “Law on Organizations in Society”) at IBC 1987 and 1988. Among others the Institution for the Welfare of Indonesian Catholic Families (“Lembaga Kesejahteraan Keluarga Katolik Indonesia,” LK3I) was given special attention, Report IBC, n. 3.1.3., pp. 29-30.


127. According to Vatican II’s “Dignitatis Humanae” the position of the Church is to state the right to religious freedom (art. 4) and at the same time to accept legitimate restraints on this freedom (art. 7); Nebres, p. 1.


129. Report IBC, n. 1.3.4., p. 12. In 1975, at the insistence of the government, a curriculum of Religious Instruction for the whole of Indonesia was composed by a team of authors appointed by the government. In 1984 the Bishops’ Commission on Catechetics played a role in revising and completing that curriculum (for primary, secondary and high schools); Report IBC, n. 1.3.6., p. 13.


131. See e.g. the daily newspapers “Angkatan Bersenjata,” “Merdeka” and “Pelita” of October 10, 1989, CSIS, Dokumentasi Kliping tentang Kunjungan Paus Yohanes Paulus II di Indonesia, 9-14 Oktober 1989, PP. 94-100.

132. See e.g., the “Jakarta Post,” the “Indonesia Times,” the “New Straits Times” of October 11, 1989; CSIS, Dokumentasi Kliping, pp. 145-149.

133. Report IBC, n. 1.6.2., pp. 16-17.


135. IBC 1989 held a particular discussion on the Bill, Hardawiryana 1989a, n. 1.8.1., p. 10.
136. IBC 1989, October 16-21, spent an evening discussing this problem with Catholic politicians involved in debates at top official level in Jakarta.

137. Pope John Paul II expressed his appreciation of “Pancasila,” e.g., during his official visit to President Soeharto at the State Palace, “Kompas,” “Suara Karya,” “Suara Pembaharuan,” “Angkatan Bersenjata”: October 10, 1989; Dokumentasi Kliping tentang Kunjungan Paus Yohanes Paulus II di Indonesia, 9-14 October 1989, pp. 88-96.


140. Yayasan Kasimo, p. 18.

141. This also became Soekarno’s personal vision of the Catholic Church in the years prior to the proclamation of Independence; Muskens 1979, p. 164; see also the quotation from Soekarno’s letter written during his exile in Flores, p. 166.

142. Cf. Kasimo, p. 48. The author stressed the fact that thanks to the endeavors of the laity, and particularly those of Catholic politicians, early in the 1940s, at the beginning of World War II, Catholics were well respected by other organizations and political parties, p. 49. Cf. Msgr. A. Soegijapranata, S.J., in March 1954: Catholics “as Indonesian citizens should not only go to church and pray, but they should also have the courage to participate in society, making their contribution, materially and spiritually, by participating in the mass organizations which really support the country’s ideal, Pancasila, which is in accordance with God’s Ten Commandments,” quoted by Muskens 1979, p. 244.

143. H. Feith, an outstanding political scientist, describes prominent members of the Catholic Party as “leaders with the administrative, technical, legal and foreign-language skills required to run the distinctively modern apparatus of a modern state... They claimed leadership positions for themselves, in both the bureaucracy, civil and military, and the political parties, on the ground of the idea, that the educated had the right to govern,” quoted by Muskens 1979, p. 244.


148. Reflecting on cases in the Philippines Nebres presents three patterns of reaction against violations of justice and human rights: a) emphasis on collaboration and accommodation with the government, b) emphasis on the revolutionary struggle, c) emphasis on substantial reform in government, using both criticism and denunciation, as well as dialogue, p. 10.

149. Hardawiryana 1989a, n. 1.8.3, p. 10 with reference to Coomans CS, p. 63; DH 7 uses the term “public order” (the American constitutional phrase: “domestic tranquility”); see comments of Nebres, pp. 4-5: “the requirements of public order are not subject to arbitrary definition, at the hands, say, of tyrannical governments, which might abuse the concept for their own ends.”

150. The Document of the Pontifical Commission “Justitia et Pax” entitled “The Church and Human Rights,” 85: “Denunciation is not the only method of putting things right: there are other ways of acting which may be better in certain circumstances,” Nebres p. 7.

151. Yayasan Kasimo, p. 19. An example of faithfulness to the Catholic cause: I. J. Kasimo sought approval of his statement in the People’s Council on July 19, 1932, from the Apostolic Vicar of Batavia; the statement was “in perfect agreement with Catholic political and social doctrine,” Muskens 1979, p. 163.

152. Yayasan Kasimo, p. 23.


154. Seda, p. 10.


157. Yayasan Kasimo especially mentions three concerns: 1) according to State laws Catholics should not be discriminated against; 2) Catholics should contribute towards the exercise of public authority which ought to be humanitarian, and for that purpose be ready to engage ever more fully in dialogue at the national and international levels; 3) the Catholic laity need internal consolidation and renewal in order to take part in efforts for a renewed political life at the national level; see pp. 34-35.

158. Yayasan Kasimo, p. 35.

159. Nebres, pp. 3-5. In this context the author explains the concept of “public order” (cf. DH 7): 1) its requirements are not subject to arbitrary definition; it is part of the universal moral order; 2) it exhibits a threefold content: a) “an order of justice, in which the rights of all citizens are effectively safeguarded, and provision is made for peaceful settlement of conflicts and rights,” b) an order of peace, the work of justice,
"when orderly processes exist for airing and settling grievances," c) a moral order, "at least in the sense that certain minimal standards of public morality are enforced at all;" the basic values (juridical, political, moral) in common welfare; together "a reasonable juridical criterion for coercive restriction of freedom."


161. "Kesepakatan Bersama para Peserta Peremuan Nasional Umat Katolik Indonesia 1984" (Statement of the National Assembly of Catholics of Indonesia, PNUKI 1984, held in Jakarta, July 8-12, 1984), n. 43; Cf: Involvement of Christians as a concrete way of living one's faith in order to build up humanity according to the spirit of the Gospel, Report IBC, n. 2.2.1, p. 21; Darmaatmadja 1989, p. 7.


164. Kieser, p. 89.

165. Kieser, p. 90.


167. Quoted by Kasimo, pp. 67-68.


176. Note that already in August 1954 the seven bishops in Java felt the need to issue guidelines about the obligations and responsibility of Catholics in society regarding the general elections; Muskens 1979, pp. 244-245. See commentary of Nebres, pp. 3-4.


181. Cf. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis 8; Libertatis Conscientia 72; Octogesima Adveniens 4.


187. GS 3; 92; Dulles, pp. 97-98.


189. In this sense lay people act as Church (one could even say: as particularly representing the Church, although they do not express the official views of the Church); Kieser, p. 91.


192. Cf. GS 75 speaking of politics as “the most honorable art.”

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